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This article seeks to rethink the conceptual framework for the
formulation of industrial policy in the conditions currently being
faced by most of the more industrialized countries of the region;
it may be noted that the debate has very similar features in the
economies at an intermediate level of industrial development too.
The authors review the different theories on government inter-
vention (section II) and the industrial policy arguments (section
III). They then consider the situation of the developing countries,
taking a structuralist view (section IV) and the interaction of the
macro- and microeconomic levels (section V), after which they
briefly review the debate in the World Bank on these matters
(section VI) and set forth the systemic approach taken by
ECLAC (section VII). In their final reflections (section VIII)
they argue that every new industrial proposal must take account
of the beneficial lessons of the past and the problems associated
with the errors made on the way, and they emphasize the need to
overcome such limitations and shortcomings in order to follow
paths that will lead to the acquisition of dynamic comparative ad-
vantages. A system based on an explicit industrial policy will
provide coordination mechanisms which are lacking in a
free-market economy but can be more efficient in a context
where the interdependence and special nature of the assets in-
volved are given importance. Industrial policy must help to coor-
dinate economic change, encourage experimentation and





The new conditions in Latin America, particularly
with regard to stabilization and the opening-up of the
economies, are acknowledged to be necessary but
not of themselves sufficient for sustaining develop-
ment in the long term, which requires growth and
new forms of specialization. The recognition that
there are imperfect markets and that there are weak-
nesses in the institutions needed to promote the de-
velopment of dynamic comparative advantages has
led to the rethinking of industrial policy, which can
hardly be based on the reproduction of the instru-
ments and institutional framework of the import sub-
stitution stage. The challenge is the same as in the
past, but the international and internal conditions
now have different roots.
At the international level, the world is passing
through a new phase of internationalization marked
by increasingly globalized real and financial markets.
The intensification of competition at the country,
sector and enterprise level is one of the main features
of the environment in which the present international
division of labour takes place. In the relation be-
tween the new patterns of international trade and the
technical and production models now characteristic
of the most highly developed countries, growing im-
portance is being assumed by the level of human re-
sources skills and the scientific and technological
base as the foundations for the formation of new
competitive capabilities.
In the new international setting, the processes of
the formation of blocs and new forms of regional in-
tegration interlinked with that setting are also becom-
ing increasingly important. Along with the growing
economic openness, they are giving rise to a transi-
tion from basically semi-closed economies to econo-
mies which, though relatively small, are increasingly
open, and they are redefining their role in the pro-
cesses of integration and globalization.
This difficult transition did not start from noth-
ing. Its starting point was in evolutionary processes
in which technological capabilities were being devel-
oped. The economies had shortcomings at the microec-
onomic level in terms of factory sizes and the limited
capacity for specialization, and there were also
serious macroeconomic imbalances reflected in the
ongoing external sector deficits or high fiscal costs
associated with the promotion of industrialization. In
spite of all these problems, however, the production
of industrial goods was accompanied by the genera-
tion of a large amount of capabilities in terms of
technology, upgrading of human resources, and the
development of business skills and institutions. It is
on the basis of this background, with all its advances
and setbacks, that each country is now facing the
challenge of progressing to production chains offer-
ing greater added value, overcoming past limitations,
and further strengthening accumulated capabilities.
In this respect, the renewed emphasis on the
need to develop a competitive strategy incorporating
a coordinated industrial policy for strengthening new
forms of specialization has a very different context
from that of the past. The definition of an industrial
policy for relatively small economies which are in a
process of change and need to restore the functioning
of their economic systems, to which end their stabili-
zation processes must be based on structural
changes, will therefore undoubtedly be very different
from the import substitution approach. For a start,
this policy will be much more complex, since it must
meet much more specific sectoral, regional and en-
trepreneurial requirements, as well as the need for
the aggiornamento of the relevant institutions to
comply with the domestic and international changes
already noted. One of its main objectives should be
to reduce uncertainty, so that the economic agents
–especially small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs)– can make a better appraisal of the settings in
which they will have to deploy their strategies.
This study seeks to rethink the conceptual
framework needed for formulating industrial policy
in the conditions currently facing the majority of the
countries of the region. The problems we will be ad-
dressing are not exclusive to them, however, and the
debate has very similar features both in the more
highly industrialized countries and in those at an in-
termediate level of industrial development.
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II
A brief summary of the theories
on government intervention
The role of the State in a market economy has been
one of the most controversial issues in economic the-
ory. It includes the appraisal of the possible benefits
of industrial policies. Chang (1994) summarizes
what has been written in the literature on government
intervention, organizing his review in the light of
four elements.
1. Efficiency
This concept is addressed in the literature on market
failures or the welfare economy, where an analysis is
made of failures of the market mechanisms to match
social and private costs and benefits and corrective
policies through State intervention are set forth.
There are three groups of arguments for justifying
such intervention:
i) Public goods: The feature defining such goods
is their “non-exclusive” nature: i.e., once a public
good is supplied to someone who pays for it, it is
also accessible to everyone else, since it is not eco-
nomically feasible to exclude those who have not
paid. Some authors refer to “non-rivality in con-
sumption”, which occurs when consumption by one
person does not reduce consumption by the others
but can also occur even when there are means of ex-
cluding other individuals (as in the case of the
so-called “club goods”). The problem of public
goods is fundamentally one of rights of ownership.
In view of the characteristics referred to above, there
is always an incentive not to display preferences for
this type of goods, so that their supply may be less
than optimal. In that case, the State must intervene
by applying taxes and providing public goods with
the money thus raised.
ii) Non-competitive markets: The existence of
economies of scale and/or collusive forms of conduct
may result in non-competitive market structures.
When monopolies or oligopolies predominate in the
market, the quantity of goods supplied is less than in
a competitive context. The State must then intervene
in order to ensure optimal production. There are also
reasons other than those of efficiency for regulating
monopolies: for example, the fact that they lead to
the concentration of economic and political power in
private hands which are not subject to democratic
control. Among the measures applied to deal with
these problems are anti-monopoly laws or public
ownership of enterprises.
iii) Externalities: These exist when there are
spillover effects from the activity of one individual to
those of others, leading to discrepancies between the
private and the social cost/benefit structures. In prin-
ciple, the problem can be solved by defining property
rights more precisely and carrying out negotiations
between the respective parties. In many cases, how-
ever, this is impossible because of the high transac-
tion costs involved in the process: in that case,
government intervention is justified to ensure the
supply of goods with externalities in socially optimal
quantities.
2. Morality
As the representative of the members of a society,
the State can intervene in the market, if necessary
at the cost of efficiency. The moralist argument
takes two forms: i) the State can intervene in the sup-
ply of merit goods, which are those whose supply so-
ciety wishes to promote (regardless of the
preferences of individual consumers) or, in the case
of demerit goods, it wishes to prevent; or ii) govern-
ment intervention may also be justified if society be-
lieves that market transactions are not morally
acceptable in some areas (such as the donation of
blood or police services). On the basis of method-
ological individualism and its politico-philosophical
counterpart, contractualism, it was held that all gov-
ernment intervention (except in the case of some
minimal functions) is illegitimate because it infringes
the liberty of the individual, viewed as the ultimate
value of human society. Consequently, liberalism
means being willing to sacrifice economic efficiency
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for the benefit of individual freedom when such
conflicts arise.
3. Intention
The economic policy literature has criticized the
approach based on the supposed existence of mar-
ket failures because it assumes that the intention or
objective of the State is to serve the general good.
There are three types of arguments which question
this assumption:
i) The autonomous State. The State can act as an
entity with its own objective function which may be
different from that of society as a whole.
ii) Interest groups. The State is seen as a stage
on which economic interest groups or normative
social movements struggle or unite to formulate
public policy decisions on the allocation of bene-
fits among the various groups demanding them.
The most powerful groups will also be those most
capable of affecting the decisions of the State, so
that economic policies will favour them.
iii) Bureaucrats protecting their own interests. It
has been suggested that public officials are in no way
different from other individuals who pursue their
own interests. As officials benefit from the higher
salaries they receive and the greater power of their
own departments, it is only reasonable that they try
to maximize their own department’s budget instead
of optimizing the social product. Consequently, pub-
lic officials will produce publicly supplied goods and
services in larger amounts than those which are so-
cially optimal.
4. Capability
The assumption of an all-powerful State has been
questioned in the literature on government failures
on the basis of two arguments:
i) The information argument, which holds that
the State can collect and process all the relevant in-
formation for correcting market failures only at a
cost which exceeds the benefits obtained. This argu-
ment has two parts: one concerns insufficient infor-
mation and the other concerns the uneven access to
information (the agent-principal problem) within the
State and between the State and the bodies its poli-
cies are aimed at.
ii) The rent-seeking argument, according to
which government intervention gives rise to addi-
tional waste of resources which may more than out-
weigh the benefits produced: the State is not only
responsible for the traditional losses due to its own
dead weight, but it also causes some resources to be
directed towards unproductive activities in order to
obtain the rents generated by its own intervention.
The literature on this subject emphasizes that the
combined results of individual maximizations may
differ greatly, depending on the institutional context.
The debate on government failures occupies a
prominent position in the literature on industrial pol-
icy. This element will largely determine the result of
the policies adopted. In a review of the arguments on
this subject made by Shapiro and Taylor (1990), the
difficulties that exist are acknowledged, but at the
same time the cases where it has been possible to
carry out successful interventions are highlighted.
III
Arguments for and against
industrial policy
In the 1980s, the intensification of competition
among enterprises belonging to highly industrialized
countries which entered activities considered to be of
high technological complexity led to the rethinking
of the question of whether or not government inter-
vention to promote particular patterns of industrial-
ization was advisable or not. On the one hand, the
advocates of industrial policy claimed that the
performance of the most dynamic sectors of the
economy depended on comparative advantages
“created” with government aid. In contrast, their
opponents denied such arguments, referring to the
“invisible hand” that would cause resources to be
allocated to the most desirable uses.
In an article published by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
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Grossman (1990) makes a useful summary of the
conceptual arguments and empirical information
supporting the opposing positions on the promotion
of new industrial activities. He also formulates a
framework for analysing government intervention
based on the welfare economy approach, comparing
the benefits generated by a promoted industry with
those that could have been generated if the resources
had been allocated to another sector of the economy.
He distinguishes three components in the surplus
generated by industry: i) the producer surplus, which
is the excess value of an industrial product over the
opportunity cost of the resources used in its produc-
tion; ii) the consumer surplus, which is the excess
utility derived by the consumer from the purchase of
a certain amount of a good over the cost of such an
acquisition, and iii) the government surplus, which is
the excess income collected by it from industry over
the subsidies paid.1
The author formalizes this approach by, on the
one hand, identifying the arguments underlying or-
thodox thinking, which ultimately criticises all forms
of intervention aimed at promoting industrial devel-
opment.2 On the other hand, as shown in table 1, he
analyses the factors determining some market failures
(economies of scale, externalities, and imperfections in
the capital and goods markets) and the distortions they
cause in a market operating under assumed perfect
competition, establishes a ranking of possible interven-
tions in the light of this, and summarizes the main theo-
retical and empirical principles justifying the promotion
of new industrial activities.
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1 The industry surplus is W = n [(p+z)x-S(x)] - n(f-v) + [U(c) -
pc] - (p-p*)e - znx - nv, where W is the total surplus of the indus-
try; n is the number of firms in the industry; x is the level of the
product of a typical local firm; p is the price paid by local con-
sumers; z is the subsidy per unit of product; S(x) is the social op-
portunity cost of the resources used to produce x, net of fixed
entry costs; f is the social cost of the resources needed for entry
(assumed to be equal to the private entry costs); v is the fixed
subsidy to induce entry; c is the level of local consumption; U(c)
is the utility obtained from the consumption of an amount c of
the good; p* is the international price of the product in local cur-
rency; and e = nx - c is the net exports (net imports if the figure
is negative). The first two terms measure the producer surplus.
The third term is the consumer surplus. The last three terms re-
flect the cost of export subsidies (or the income from import tar-
iffs, if p is greater than p* and e is negative), or production
subsidies, and the subsidies for inducing entry which help to
cover the fixed costs, respectively. Government intervention
changes some of the amounts in the right hand side of the equa-
tion. The overall change in W is the result of the changes in the








∆e + W p* ∆p*. The terms in this equation can be expressed as
the sum of seven different effects: 1) The benefits capture effect,
n[p-m(x)]∆x where m(x) is the private marginal cost. This oc-
curs in oligopolistic markets when the policies induce firms to
change their level of production. 2) The externalities effect,
n[m(x)-s(x)]∆x, where s(x) is the social marginal cost. This oc-
curs when the policies induce a change in resource use in situa-
tions where the amount that firms pay for their inputs is
different from the social opportunity cost. 3) The entry benefits
effect, [px-M(x)- f]∆n, where M(x) is the total private cost of
producing x units, net of the fixed entry costs f. It reflects the ex-
cess operating benefits obtained by new firms induced to enter
by the policies over the private costs of such entry. 4) The entry
externality effect, [M(x)-S(x)]∆n; when the number of firms in
the industry changes, this term measures how far the private pro-
duction costs of the new firms exceed the social costs. 5) The
trade volume effect, (p-p*)∆e; domestic prices will be different
from their opportunity cost (p*) if there are trade policies. These
policies which alter the volume of trade have implications for
efficiency, since local decisions are based on prices which differ
from the opportunity cost. 6) The terms of trade effect, e∆p*,
which reflects the benefits obtained by a country when its ex-
ports command a higher price on the world market or when it is
able to import at lower prices. Policies which induce an expan-
sion in exports generally give rise to a fall in the world price of
the good in question and are therefore a negative component of
the surplus. Policies which restrict imports have a positive effect
if the country has significant status on world markets and affects
the international price of the imported good. 7) Consumer sur-
plus effect, [u(c)-p] ∆c, where u(c) is the marginal utility of the
good after the consumption of c units. It measures the social
gain from an increase in consumption of the good in question.
.2 The orthodox paradigm assumes that there are no entry barri-
ers, that the local firms are small and cannot influence the mar-
ket price of their products, that there are no externalities, etc.
Freedom of entry thus means that the surplus benefits (those that
exceed the fixed costs of entry)will be zero. Producers receive
p+z per unit of product. This means that (p+z)x = M(x)+f. Each
firm produces until the marginal cost m(x) equals the price p+z
that it receives. The effects are reduced to 1) -nz∆ x and 3)
-zx∆n. The first of these terms is negative if there is a production
subsidy (z>0) to promote the expansion of firms. The second
term is also negative if a production subsidy is used to induce
entry (∆n>0). For the assumptions adopted in this case, effects
2) and 4) disappear. Effect 7) also disappears, since each con-
sumer selects an optimum level of purchases, with the price of
the last unit purchased being equal to its marginal utility: u(c) =
p. If a subsidy is used to promote exports (∆e>0), the domes-
tic price p will be greater than p* and effect 5) will therefore be
negative. Finally, if export or production subsidies are used,
sales on world markets will expand and the international price
p* will fall. If the country is a net exporter of the good in ques-
tion (e>0), national welfare will go down. Consequently, for ex-
port industries, production or trade subsidies only generate
negative components in the analysis of the surpluses, so that the
promotion of industry through whatever type of intervention
only serves to reduce welfare.
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TABLE 1
Market failures: Factors, effects and possible forms of intervention
(Arguments summarized by Grossman)
Factors responsible for
some market failures
Distortionary effects with respect to a
market with perfect competition
Possible forms of State intervention Bibliographical refer-
ences on theoretical
and empirical aspectsa
I. ECONOMIES OF SCALE
A. “Static”
economies of scale.
High fixed entry costs. Few firms are ca-
pable of entering with scales of produc-
tion that give profits.
Existence of minimum scale of operation
with diminishing mean costs.
Entry subsidies if the consumer surplus is
greater than the private operating losses
and the effect is negative because of the








Existence of a pronounced learning curve.
Production costs are initially high but go
down rapidly as experience is accumu-
lated in the new activity.
Entry subsidies during the learning phase
if the consumer surplus is greater than the
private operating losses due to such entry.
Entry of more than one firm reduces the
volume of sales of the existing firms and
the rate at which they gain experience and












of entry (particular case
of static or dynamic
economies of scale).
Size of the world market only permits one
firm in the activity in question. The gov-
ernment undertakes to support local firms
in their efforts to compete with rival for-
eign firms for possession of an emerging
market.
Entry subsidy because of the monopoly





















Significant investments in the creation of
knowledge. Knowledge as a “public
good”. Spread of the fruits of research
and development efforts throughout soci-
ety is efficient and possibly inevitable.
Private agents will only assume costs if
they can internalize the benefits.
Subsidies for private research and develop-
ment costs.
Encouragement for firms to internalize the
externalities associated with the creation
of new technologies through the promo-
tion of joint ventures for research and de-
velopment.
Increased protection abroad for intellectual
property rights.
Use of production or export subsidies, or
protection of the domestic market, al-




















B. Learning by doing
(outside the firm).
Productivity gains from production expe-
rience may be built up by firms other than
that which began the manufacturing pro-
cess (classic variant of the infant industry
argument).
Production subsidy due to the benefits of
the externality in question. Trade policy is
a substitutive variable which promotes




Bell, Ross Larson and
Westphal, 1984
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Distortionary effects with respect to a
market with perfect competition





on the job training.
Externalities of investment in human
capital. Firms intervene in a sub-optimal
manner.
Subsidies for investment in human capital.
As in the case of the externalities of re-
search and development, production subsi-
dies or trade policies do not guarantee








D. Failures of coordina-
tion and vertical link-
ages.
If the economies of scale are significant
and exports are limited by transport costs
or trade barriers, entry of a producer may
be inhibited the lack of a purchaser for
his product. At the same time, a potential
producer who uses the above product as
an input may be inhibited from entering
by his inability to obtain a low-cost sup-
ply of that input. The market solution in-
volves a failure of coordination: neither
of the two is willing to assume the high





III. IMPERFECTIONS IN THE CAPITAL MARKET
A. Divergences
between the social
and private costs of
funds.
An exogenous divergence exists between
the social opportunity cost of funds and
the rate at which the market makes them
available to borrowers. Such divergences
may be due to the lenders’ inability to
make proper evaluations, to their “irratio-
nal” aversion to risk, or to their system-
atic over-estimation of the risk of new
activities.
Loan subsidies if the private rates are not
appropriate.
Subsidies for guarantors or tax compensa-
tion for firms’ losses in order to relieve
part of private exposure if the aversion to
risk is too great. Such subsidies and tax
benefits must be available for all investors
in all sectors, unless the market is known
to discriminate systematically against cer-
tain types of activities.
Kafka, 1962
B. Uneven access to
information.
Borrowers undoubtedly know more about
the nature and degree of risk and the
probable returns in various alternative sit-
uations and about their own capacity to
undertake a new activity. This uneven ac-
cess to information would not be impor-
tant for lenders if the debt contracts
ensured repayment under all circum-
stances. Credit markets typically involve
State protection under limited responsi-
bility laws and therefore expose lenders
to the danger that a firm will declare
itself bankrupt (the “adverse selection”
problem).
Selective interest rate subsidies, only in
cases where the market mechanisms sys-
tematically select those firms or potential
entrants which are least attractive from the
social point of view.
Stiglitz and Weiss,
1981





IV. IMPERFECTIONS IN THE GOODS MARKET
A. Quality reputation
as an entry barrier.
Consumers have imperfect information
on product characteristics. New entrants
suffer from the problem of lack of an es-
tablished quality reputation.
“Differential” incentives for firms to pro-






Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of Grossman, 1990.
a These bibliographical references are taken from Grossman (1990), where they are given in greater detail.
1. Comparison with the organization of
financial markets
The arguments presented by Grossman, which justify
selective government intervention designed to secure
an increase in social welfare, are complementary and
are clearly illustrated, in the particular case of finan-
cial markets, in a recent study by Stiglitz (1993).
These markets are particularly important for the in-
dustrial sector.
Essentially, financial markets are connected with
resource allocation, so that it may be said that they
form the “brain” of the economic system: the central
point in the taking of decisions. It is because of this
role of financial markets that their performance is so
important: if they fail to do their job properly, not
only will the benefits be smaller, but this may even
adversely affect the functioning of the entire eco-
nomic system. According to Stiglitz, there are seven
market flaws which can justify government interven-
tion in financial markets: i) problems of the “public
good” in matters of financial supervision; ii) exter-
nalities of financial supervision, selection and grant-
ing of loans; iii) externalities of financial upsets;
iv) absent or incomplete markets; v) imperfect com-
petition; vi) inefficiency of competitive markets, in
the Paretian sense, and vii) investors lacking the
necessary information.
Stiglitz’s study also describes the forms of gov-
ernment intervention most commonly observed in fi-
nancial markets and a set of principles determining
the regulations to be applied to the sector. Finally, he
analyses a special form of intervention: financial re-
pression. Stiglitz concludes that the State has a role
to play in financial markets because of the market
failures described above.
2. Transaction costs and failures of
coordination
Another way of interpreting industrial policy stems
from the use of the concept of “transaction costs”
(see Chang, 1994). The school of thought that
stresses the transaction costs of the new institutional
economy notes that the market transactions through
which resources are allocated in market economies
are not exempt from costs, as neoclassical economics
assumes: since individuals have only limited ratio-
nality, they allocate resources in order to establish
safeguards against opportunistic conduct by their
trading partners (to cover the costs of drawing up
and enforcing a contract, for example). This recent
contribution to economic theory emphasizes that the
achievement of efficiency (or the coordination of the
forms of conduct of interdependent but also inde-
pendent agents) involves costs over and above those
deriving from failure to obtain the highest possible
degree of social welfare. From this point of view,
then, costs include not only those involved in the
production of goods but also –and to a significant ex-
tent– the costs of allocating resources among produc-
tion units and managing the production process
within the units. These costs of coordination between
and within economic units, which must be distin-
guished from purely engineering costs, have been
given the name of “transaction costs”.
If transaction costs are those incurred with the
aim of defining and redefining the property (and
other) rights of economic agents, on the one hand,
and drafting, reviewing and enforcing contracts
within the existing structure of rights, on the other,
then the costs of government intervention can also be
reinterpreted as transaction costs. The costs of the in-
formation needed to take decisions and apply poli-
cies are of this type, and the costs deriving from
rent-seeking activities designed to redefine the struc-
ture of property rights can also be classified in this
way. In the real world, both State interventions and
market transactions generate costs, so that a compari-
son must be made between the costs of allocating re-
sources through market transactions and the costs of
doing so through State interventions. This gives rise
to a new role for the State: the reduction of transac-
tion costs in the economy.
An important function of the State is to establish
and enforce a well-defined system of property rights
which reduces transaction costs; if it does not
achieve this, then those agents whose decisions are
interdependent will have to engage in extraordinary
expenditure to solve the problem of externalities. Al-
though this does not necessarily have to be a task for
the State, the fact that the government is the only
body which has the legitimate right to use force
means that the most efficient agent for carrying out
this function is indeed the State. Another role for the
State in bringing down transaction costs is the reduc-
tion of macroeconomic instability. When faced with
growing macroeconomic instability, agents with lim-
ited rationality will devote resources to activities that
seek to create suitable conditions for enabling ratio-
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nal calculation (for example, by drafting, revising
and enforcing long-term supply or subcontracting
contracts, or maintaining stocks). As macroeconomic
instability is essentially a lack of coordination be-
tween the activities of different individuals, this ar-
gument can be extended to the problem of
coordination in general (for example, the establish-
ment by the State of a system of weights and mea-
sures or technological standards).
In order to achieve this coordination, the State
does not necessarily have to completely take the
place of market transactions. Indeed, such an exer-
cise could be prohibitively costly, as the central plan-
ning practices of the Socialist countries have shown.
There are ways in which the State can reduce trans-
action costs without eliminating all market transac-
tions: i) by changing the institutional configuration
of society (for example, by giving legal backing to
the organization of agents in larger groups and the
reduction of the number of bargaining processes
needed, as in the case of the social corporativism
applied in Scandinavia or Austria): ii) through its
influence on the educational system and the commu-
nications media, promoting a “national ideology”
or system of values which helps to reduce the costs
involved in the exchange of information and in
negotiations (as in South Korea and Japan, which
are considered to be homogeneous societies); iii) by
providing a “focal point” or consensus around
which decisions can be coordinated (as occurs in
investments in complementary projects in France
and Japan).
An industrial policy system offers coordination
mechanisms which may be lacking in a free market
economy. As a coordination mechanism, industrial
policy may be more efficient in a context where the
interdependence and special features of assets are
important considerations. In this case, coordination
through the market would involve high negotiation
costs, while coordination through centralized plan-
ning would involve high information costs, whereas
industrial policy would probably have low costs in
both cases. Industrial policy also appears to be a su-
perior way of promoting technical progress. On the
one hand, it does not eliminate the profit motive, as
centralized planning does, and through the socializa-
tion of risks it can promote changes over and above
those that the market can induce by itself.
In examining the logic underlying industrial pol-
icy, it is desirable to separate the roles it plays in the
static and in the dynamic dimensions. In both cases,
the function of industrial policy is the same: to avoid
failures of coordination. As Chang (1994) notes,
when the assets have special features, ex post coordi-
nation through the market can be anti-economic,
since the failures of coordination involving specific
assets gives rise to a net reduction in the total amount
of resources available for the economy. One of the
features of modern industrialized economies is their
use of production technologies which require large
fixed investments and therefore involve economies
of scale. Moreover, a large part of their assets are
specific or “sunk”. The result is an oligopolistic in-
dustry in which there is strategic interdependence of
the firms’ decisions.
Under certain likely conditions, this interdepen-
dence leads to inefficient results which would justify
State intervention. In this case, the intervention
would not necessarily take the form of an
anti-monopoly policy, since the benefits of breaking
the oligopoly could be offset by higher costs result-
ing from suboptimal scales of production. Here, in-
dustrial policy can play a distinguished role through
measures such as the following:
i) Coordination of investments: as overinvestment
or underinvestment are problems of strategic uncer-
tainty which can cause a number of firms to go bank-
rupt and lose the resources invested, the State can
intervene in the industry in question to ensure that there
is an optimal level of entry into it, assuring possible en-
trants to this effect;
ii) Recession cartels: when there is a temporary
fall in demand, it is preferable to organize recession
cartels rather than to allow firms to start a price war
which can lead, among other things, to the loss of so-
cial resources or the survival only of the strongest
firms, which will later collect monopoly benefits
when the economy starts to recover;
iii) Negotiated reduction of production capac-
ity: when a persistent fall in demand makes it neces-
sary for some firms to leave the industry, it may
happen that none of them wish to do so because they
themselves would benefit from the withdrawal of
other firms. This could lead to a war of attrition
among the firms which would benefit no-one, thus
justifying intervention.
Some opponents of industrial policy claim that
although this may solve the static coordination prob-
lem, it may be harmful in the long term because it
impedes the functioning of the natural selection
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mechanisms of the economy and hence the achieve-
ment of dynamic efficiency, as the countries with
centrally planned economies show. They do not
mention, however, that economic changes may also
require coordination in order to be successful. More-
over, if the risks must be assumed only by individu-
als, it may be that the necessary changes do not take
place at all. The socialization of risk through State
intervention is a way of promoting changes which in-
volve interdependence.
Industrial policy must help to coordinate eco-
nomic change, to promote experimentation, and to
preserve diversity. In a world of interdependent rela-
tions, the fact that a better alternative exists does not
necessarily mean that there will be a corresponding
change. In the real world, many changes involve in-
terdependent decisions. Likewise, infant industries
may need certain guarantees (for example, regarding
the entry of possible competitors) in order to embark
on a path which can lead to the extensive creation of
knowledge. It may be desirable to protect such indus-
tries and coordinate projects that may compete with
each other. When the market in question has ma-
tured, all that is needed is to apply static industrial
policies in such cases as the organization of “reces-
sion cartels”. When the market has passed this stage
and is over-mature, industrial policy once again has a
role to play in the coordination of negotiated with-
drawals and elimination of installed capacity. With
regard to the relation between industrial policy and
the product cycle, it may be observed that dynamic
industrial policy is only called for in the first of these
stages.
Finally, as Nelson (1989) notes, it is preferable
to waste resources through the duplication of inno-
vation efforts than to advance in only a single di-
rection which may later prove to be mistaken.
Diversity has its advantages, since no-one can be
sure of the future. Industrial policy’s place in tech-
nological innovation lies in complementing an im-
perfect capital market, subsidizing the entry of
firms into activities with high fixed entry costs,
and coordinating university research and its link-
ages with the world of production. For Chang,
growth is due to the fact that agents have experi-
mented with new things and new ways of doing
them. To make this possible, many institutions
were set up which allowed the risks inherent in in-
novation to be socialized. The State can provide
more of these institutions.
3. Constructing the market
In an effort to construct a conceptual framework for
a new approach to industrial policy in an open econ-
omy, Bianchi (1993 and 1994) has prepared a num-
ber of extremely useful elements. He has taken up
once again Adam Smith’s idea of the market, which
was developed for a situation marked by emerging
capitalist societies and runs counter to the qualities
of “loyalty and protection” of the feudal mecha-
nisms, which were rigidly based on hierarchical ex-
changes determined by the social position of the
actors. For Smith, the market is a complex social in-
stitution and a meeting point for horizontal relations
in which relative power is not a given value but is at-
tainable on the basis of the ability to organize pro-
ductive activity. This market requires collective rules
and an authority capable of supervising and stimulat-
ing competition among the economic agents, which
is the foundation for structural change. The effi-
ciency of production depends on the capacity to or-
ganize it so that specific skills are developed and it is
continually strengthened by the feedback from spe-
cialization and complementarity. In Smith’s scheme,
social interaction is not only competitive but also co-
operative, since the division of labour is based on the
complementary specialized capabilities of individu-
als and firms. It is obvious that the stimulus for so-
cial dynamics is all the greater when there is
plurality and diversity: that is to say, when there is a
large number and variety of subjects interacting in
the economy.
Government intervention is justified insofar as it
increases the division of labour, expands the market
and facilitates the use of the whole power of the mar-
ket to develop competitiveness. Such intervention is
not sufficient if it only takes place at the individual
level: it will have more effect if there are progressive
coalitions designed to generate reactions towards in-
novation which cause the individual and social bene-
fits to come closer to each other. Smith reminds us
that an economy based on the development of the
market forces requires a strong State, not only to
guarantee property rights and to legitimize private
contracts, but also to ensure those positive externali-
ties that no individual citizen could maintain un-
aided, such as defence, justice, and the public
activities needed for collective growth (including,
inter alia, communications and the educational and
health systems).
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Smith was against any kind of protectionism and
was an ardent defender of free trade, which to him
meant the broadening of the market and, hence, an
increase in the multiplicity of competing agents. In
particular, when economic underdevelopment is
combined with the deterioration of institutions, what
is needed is not to “return to the market” but to “con-
struct the market”. This means acting on the institu-
tions of collective life and providing the capabilities
that will allow the majority of the subjects to take
part in them effectively. Likewise, public policies for
furthering industrial development must be designed
not only to favour a change in the institutional envi-
ronment in which firms operate but also to take con-
crete measures to favour industrial cooperation
among firms, so as to make possible individual spe-
cialization in a context of complementarity and
broadening of the market.
In the event of a change in the situation –for ex-
ample, the upsets accompanying processes of greater
trade openness– the policies needed to speed up
structural and institutional changes must be identi-
fied, in order to establish the necessary conditions
and rights of participation of the economic agents
(with full equality of opportunities) and to strengthen
their capabilities so as to facilitate active and grow-
ing integration into the globalization process. For
this, it is necessary to construct a system of consen-
sual interrelations in which the systemic conditions
form the backbone of macroeconomic policies sup-
ported by feedback from “everyday capability build-
ing”. This means establishing or strengthening
networks, strengthening the links between institu-
tions and firms, and enhancing spatial relations at the
local, regional, national and international level.
A situation of autarky is always difficult, as
there is the danger of growing domestic dissatisfac-
tion and the emergence of regressive coalitions
which block change. In this context, a protectionist
movement may be either a regressive result or an in-
termediate solution for enabling domestic reorgani-
zation which could turn potentially regressive
coalitions into coalitions capable of identifying ways
of collective development through redefinition of the
division of labour. A regional-level economic inte-
gration agreement can therefore be a means of guid-
ing the processes of openness and structural
adjustment in such a way as to sustain them without
causing damage through over-hasty action or falling
into situations of indefinite protectionism. It is possi-
ble to generate dynamic effects if the transition to-
wards a customs union is regulated in time so as to
permit the adjustment of the national production
structures during the transition: this would give rise
to a progressive coalition which will press towards
complete openness, increasing the number of agents
capable of sustaining it through a rapid structural
adjustment process.
IV
The case of the developing countries:
a structuralist approach
Many authors have studied the reasons for the very
uneven results obtained by semi-industrialized coun-
tries in their efforts to ensure a self-sustaining eco-
nomic growth process and to improve their social
welfare. Among them, Lall (1992a and b; 1993;
1994a and b) centers his attention on the industrial
policy debate and its links with the concept of tech-
nological capabilities in order to try to explain the
different degrees of industrial and technological de-
velopment.
The need for an industrial policy stems from the
problem of the efficiency of markets. If markets
work perfectly, they will give optimal results which,
by definition, could not be improved by any type of
intervention. When markets do not work perfectly,
there could be a need for intervention to improve the
economic performance. This will depend on the na-
ture and magnitude of the market failures and the ca-
pacity of governments to design and implement the
necessary intervention measures (while at the same
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time appraising the possible costs of government
failures). Lall puts forward three alternative ap-
proaches to the role of industrial policy: the neoclas-
sical approach, the market-friendly approach, and the
structuralist approach. The differences between them
derive from the assumptions each of them make on
how markets operate in the developing countries and
how capable governments are of overcoming market
failures, when these exist.
According to the neoclassical approach, all
markets are perfect and any intervention would dis-
tort resource allocation; the static optimization of re-
source allocation obtained through the functioning of
free markets also leads to the maximization of
growth.
According to the market-friendly approach,
the developing countries do suffer from market fail-
ures and functional, selective interventions are there-
fore needed to overcome them, but in practice only
the former are feasible and desirable, either because
those failures which call for selective remedies are of
insignificant importance for industrial development
or because selective interventions are inherently
more costly than the flaws they are supposed to cor-
rect (government failures are always worse than mar-
ket failures in this type of situation). This approach
abandons some of the assumptions of the neoclassi-
cal approach. It acknowledges that factor markets
may not operate perfectly, and that education mar-
kets, in particular, may call for interventions in order
to create the human capital base required by industri-
alization, but these interventions must be market-
friendly (i.e., non-selective) because of the implicit
assumption that skills are generic. It recognizes that
there may be market failures in the coordination of
investment decisions in industry due to various rea-
sons: absence of information markets, shortcomings
in the capital market, economies of scale, interdepen-
dent investments in vertically related activities, exter-
nalities in the creation and learning of skills, and
multiple linkages.
The structuralist approach holds that both
functional and selective interventions are needed to
promote development, and that governments are ca-
pable of carrying them out. Industrialization may still
take place in the absence of selective interventions,
but its pattern and depth will be affected, and in the
developing countries it will tend to be fragile in most
circumstances. As market failures differ in their inci-
dence and intensity in different activities, the inter-
ventions to correct them must necessarily be
selective. Without them, this approach predicts, re-
source allocation would be sub-optimal and growth
would be restricted. The distinction between market-
friendly and selective interventions is a false di-
lemma. There is no economic basis for drawing a
distinction between functional and selective inter-
ventions: any intervention which corrects a market
failure is automatically market-friendly. Nor does
economics find any justification, a priori, for the ar-
gument that except in the case of functional interven-
tions the government will probably do more harm
than good. This is a political argument of dubious
empirical value.
On the basis of this structuralist approach, Lall
develops a series of arguments centered on the ac-
quisition of technological capabilities and the flaws
encountered in this process. He notes that in manu-
facturing, these capabilities are not limited to the
technology embodied in physical equipment or in
manuals, plans and patents acquired by the firm, al-
though these do indeed represent the means through
which these capabilities are put to work. Nor are they
limited to the educational qualifications of the work-
ers, although a base which is receptive to the acquisi-
tion of skills does depend to a large extent on the
education and training of the workers involved. Nor
are they limited to the skills and training that individ-
uals receive in the firm, although these do represent
the bricks with which capabilities are built at the mi-
cro level. Instead, capabilities are the way in which
an institution –such as a firm, for example– com-
bines all the foregoing in order to function as an or-
ganization, with ongoing interaction among its
members, effective flows of information and deci-
sions, and a synergy which is greater than the sum of
all the individual skills and knowledge. It is concep-
tually useful to consider the development of competi-
tiveness at the level of the firm as investment in
embodied technology, accompanied by investments
in skills, information, organizational improvements,
and relations with other firms and institutions.
Exposure to international markets provides vari-
ous stimuli for the development of capabilities. Inter-
national competition stimulates efforts to reduce
costs, to improve quality and to introduce new prod-
ucts; makes it possible to obtain economies of scale,
and provides constant information on improvements
in designs and processes that speed up the achieve-
ment of higher productivity (gains in dynamic tech-
nical efficiency). In order to reach international
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levels of efficiency in complex technologies –with
dissemination of externalities and feedback to strate-
gic activities–, however, time, investments and ef-
forts are needed. It would be very hard for firms to
cover the costs involved if they are exposed to global
competition from the start, and moreover the capital
markets are not generally prepared to back them.
Consequently, there are arguments connected with
the treatment of infant industries which are valid for
the protection of new industries, but not in the usual
sense of low and uniform protection. The duration
and scope of protection cannot be uniform when dif-
ferent technologies have different costs and learning
curves.
Not all market failures require intervention. The
need to intervene arises when solutions do not appear
or need some kind of stimulus to appear. The risk of
a government failure must be faced whenever politi-
cal solutions are recommended for market flaws. The
government, like the market, can have different de-
grees of success or failure and, like the market, gov-
ernments can improve with time and effort. In some
cases, there may be no alternative to State interven-
tion. In others, a reasonable balance needs to be
drawn between the costs and benefits of intervention,
on the one hand, and the market flaws on the other. It
is generally agreed that the provision of basic educa-
tion and infrastructural services connected with in-
dustrial and technological development should be in
government hands. In this respect, the need to
strengthen the capabilities of the government and im-
prove its performance seems to be unavoidable. The
most serious problem arises when the forms of inter-
vention adopted are more selective. Such policies re-
quire great skill, information and discipline on the
part of the government, since they usually foster
rent-seeking forms of conduct and the appearance of
pressure groups. They could prove very costly if they
are badly formulated or applied, but if they are car-
ried out properly they will determine the nature and
success of the industrial development process.
Firms from developing countries have to face
various market failures. The nature of these failures
is not always the same. They depend on each coun-
try’s specific objectives as regards the activities they
wish to enter, the growth in incorporation of local in-
puts that they are pursuing, and the level of techno-
logical competence and endogenous innovative
capacity they wish to develop. The need for interven-
tion must be determined within this context. Indus-
trial development does not only mean embarking on
new activities. As economies progress and mature,
this means a deepening of the process in some or all
of the following four ways: introducing technologi-
cal improvements in products and processes in in-
dustry, embarking on new activities which are more
complex and demanding, increasing the proportion
of local content, and mastering more complex tech-
nological tasks in firms (ranging from assembly op-
erations to those required for activities involving
greater added value, adaptation, improvement, and
finally design, development and innovation). Each of
these has its own learning costs. Progressive deepen-
ing is a natural part of industrial development, up to
a certain point, but it is not automatic and inevitable.
Its pattern and incidence differ widely, depending on
the strategies followed by the societies in question.
The process of forming capabilities can come up
against various market flaws. With regard to prod-
ucts, free markets may not give the right signals for
resource allocation, while with regard to factors, they
may not lead to an optimal supply of inputs,
especially in the case of skills and information.
Free markets may suffer from two different types
of flaws: i) those that affect optimum allocation of
investments between simple and complex activities,
and ii) those that affect such allocation between
physical investments, purchase of technology, and
domestic technological efforts. The first-named pro-
vide the arguments in favour of the classic case of
protection for infant industries. When there are costs
involved in learning, a late entrant into an industry
necessarily faces greater disadvantages than those
who embarked on the learning process earlier. In
view of the uncertainty, the lack of information and
the imperfections in the capital market which are
endemic in the developing countries, full exposure to
competition from imports can inhibit entry into activ-
ities involving relatively complex technologies. Be-
cause learning costs differ from one activity to
another, intervention to ensure efficient resource al-
location must be selective rather than uniform.
The second type of allocation problems, which
affect the deepening of capabilities in industrial ac-
tivities, can also be affected by market flaws. Arrow
(1962) noted quite a long time ago that the free mar-
ket can fail to ensure optimal innovative activity be-
cause of the imperfect appropriability of information
and skills. The developing countries also face an-
other problem. It is generally easy to import techno-
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logical “packages” from abroad, where the process
has already been commercially tested: the vendor
supplies the equipment and programmes, puts them
into operation, carries out the necessary training and
adaptations, and runs the operating and marketing as-
pects. In its most extreme form, this procedure is tan-
tamount to foreign direct investment (FDI). Although
it represents an effective and relatively less risky
way of gaining access to technology, it does not
cause developing countries to acquire greater capa-
bilities, other than the skills needed for the produc-
tion activities. Moving on from those activities to
innovation involves a different strategic decision
which foreign investors in those countries are not
very willing to take. There is thus a risk of market
failures in the process of deepening capabilities be-
cause of the learning costs, which are of a very simi-
lar nature to those involved in the case of an infant
industry. In order to ensure socially optimal alloca-
tion it may be necessary to selectively restrict the im-
portation of technological “packages” and promote
that of “externalized” technologies (licences or
equipment). Many technologies, however, are only
available through FDI, or else they are too complex
for local capabilities, and must therefore be imported
in the form of packages. It may also be necessary to
promote the emergence of larger-scale firms. Tech-
nological deepening can be a legitimate objective of
industrial policy, however, as the development of en-
dogenous design and innovation capacity has various
positive externalities.
These considerations are also applicable to the
deepening of local integration through the develop-
ment of local suppliers and subcontractors. As well
as bringing benefits in terms of production, the re-
sulting interrelations speed up the spread of technol-
ogy, increase specialization, and enhance industrial
flexibility. In particular, the development of local
equipment suppliers can increase the generation and
spread of technologies. Because of these externali-
ties, there may be justification for the promotion of
clusters of related activities which would otherwise
not be capable of coordinating their investments and
the selection of groups of activities considered to
have greater learning potential because they use ad-
vanced technologies. Once again, the nature of the
possible market failures will depend on the particular
economy in question and its technological ambitions.
As the needs for skills and information differ in
the different industrial activities, interventions in
these factor markets must be integrated with those
designed to promote the activities in question or to
further technological deepening. Interventions to fa-
cilitate the functioning of the market must therefore
necessarily be selective, inasmuch as the skills and
information become specific rather than generic.
Finally, as protection reduces the incentive to invest
in the development of capabilities, industrial policy
must offer compensatory incentives in the form of
performance requirements (entrance into export mar-
kets in a short space of time).
The development of industrial competitiveness
and its dynamic evolution over time mean that firms
must continually invest in learning new capabilities
and improving existing ones. The learning process
comes up against various market flaws which con-
ventional theory overlooks. Once these are taken into
account, the scope of industrial policy for creating
and sustaining comparative advantages becomes
much clearer. In most developing countries the prob-
lem is not the establishment of new industries –since
they already have significant industrial structures–
but the fact that the existing ones are inefficient.
Such countries have invested relatively little in the
formation of industrial capabilities or have developed
capabilities of the wrong type (designed to produce
with the available materials or to adapt products for
protected domestic markets, rather than to reduce
costs, raise quality and constantly introduce new
products). Consequently, they need to restructure the
existing industries and reallocate resources effi-
ciently. This involves the liberalization of the rules
governing trade and competition, the disappearance
of activities which cannot become competitive within
a reasonable length of time with an acceptable level
of investment in restructuring, and the progress of
activities which could be efficient if they improved
their technological and management capacity and re-
newed their equipment. A careful programme of lib-
eralization by stages, together with a coherent set of
support measures in the areas of technology and
skills, could enable certain activities to reach interna-
tional standards.
In short, the promotion of industrial develop-
ment may call for interventions to overcome market
failures in resource allocation between activities and
within firms. These interventions may be selective
and fit in with the learning processes of the firms.
They may cover certain activities or sets of activities,
and they may require action to promote the emer-
gence of larger-scale enterprises. They may be inte-
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grated with selective interventions in the factor
markets, including measures affecting the way tech-
nology is imported, and they must be offset by incen-
tives to invest in the formation of capabilities.
The scheme shown in table 2 was developed by
Lall (1993) to analyse the determining factors of in-
dustrial and technological development, the market
failures that may exist, and possible corrective poli-
cies. The long process of development of capabilities
comes up against an important set of market failures
for which very varied forms of intervention may be
suggested. Experience indicates that differences in
performance between countries are associated with
institutional policy design, and it also indicates that
policy failures are one of the dangers of not properly
applying the corrections needed from the economic
point of view.
Justman and Teubal (1991), coinciding also with
Bianchi, note that structural changes are a necessary
condition for growth, so inability to generate them
may impede subsequent development. They also
concur with Lall about the fundamental importance
of specific capabilities and skills and the need for a
“critical mass” of efforts for their implementation.
The combination of these two factors gives rise to a
infrastructure of specific skills, while their absence
encourages a form of resource allocation by the mar-
ket which may not be efficient. This infrastructure
may make it necessary to decide between alternative
growth paths, which may be mutually exclusive if re-
sources are limited and the critical mass required by
one or the other of them is relatively large. There is
no reason why such a choice should be more effi-
cient if made in a decentralized manner. It may be
that a coordinated effort among different economic
agents is needed in order to ensure that the most de-
sirable path is followed.
This structuralist approach means that the capac-
ity to generate “technology-driven” structural change
is a source of comparative advantages in itself, and it
brings out the importance of accumulating both
physical capital and intangible resources. It also sug-
gests that the government has a new and more com-
plex role to play in the pursuit of industrial growth,
due to the possibility of generating comparative ad-
vantages through the promotion of structural change.
Although structural change is difficult, it can speed
up economic growth once it is materialized. This
speeding-up is associated with a “violent realloca-
tion” of resources that accompanies such change.
According to the structuralist approach, the gen-
eration of comparative advantages is a complex pro-
cess in which the accumulation of physical capital
interacts with the accumulation of specific skills and
the development of specific elements of the techno-
logical infrastructure. This specificity leads to policy
aims that go beyond achievement of the optimal rate
of saving or the optimal growth rate of any aggregate
variable: instead, it involves the identification of
structural changes which would be desirable for the
economy and the definition of the type of infrastruc-
ture (including the types of capabilities) that must be
developed for bringing on such changes. These is-
sues are of an inherently strategic and long-term na-
ture and mean deciding on one of the possible
development paths, which are relatively indivisible.
The consequent investment decisions are practically
irreversible and affect a broad spectrum of present
and future economic agents.
Structuralist authors note that market failures are
characteristic features of development and occur par-
ticularly in the “nodes” of structural change, so that
they cannot be considered as isolated or exceptional
phenomena. In these nodes, structural change is fea-
sible but the economy may fail when trying to imple-
ment it. In order for such change to take place, it is
necessary to carry out a violent reallocation of re-
sources (“creative destruction”). Coordination is
therefore essential in order to ensure that the desired
form of reallocation takes place without leading to
excessive social and political upsets. In the structural
change nodes, a critical mass of more than one of the
resources may be needed (for example, skills plus
capital investment). Without increased investment in
physical capital, it might not be beneficial to acquire
advanced skills, while without a critical mass of
trained labour the yield on the capital invested might
not be sufficient. The indivisibilities that exist sug-
gest that the market will not always coordinate auto-
matically in an optimal manner. This is not a
problem that only exists in the first phases of devel-
opment: it arises in all the structural change nodes
that require the concerted accumulation of critical
masses of specific resources. The formation of this
type of technological infrastructure is “strategic”, be-
cause particular configurations may determine the
group of industries in which future comparative ad-
vantages are being generated. The problem facing
the economy is how to select indivisible investment
programmes, each of which leads to a different
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TABLE 2





Market failures Policy remedies
Incentives:
Macroeconomic policies. Not applicable.
Foreign competition. Full exposure to competition leads to underinvestment in
ITD because of externalities, unpredictable learning, lack
of understanding of ITD process, investment complemen-
tarities, information gaps, risk aversion.
Infant industry protection for difficult new
activities (very selective, monitored, lim-
ited in duration, with safeguards, inte-
grated with development of skills and
institutional development).
Phased liberalization, taking account of
relearning costs.
Domestic competition. Market power, economies of scale and scope, complemen-
tarities, need of large size to enter world markets and un-
dertake advanced training and R&D.
Ensure competition, regulate monopolies,
but create large firms where necessary to
exploit scale economics in ITD and mar-
keting.
Skills:




Scientific and basic research.
Managerial, organizational,
marketing.
Investments in formal education suffer from lumpiness,
missing markets (lack of supply of teachers and facilities),
risk, imperfect foresight, lack of information. Quality con-
trol and curriculum content suffer from information gaps.
Investments by firms in training suffer from externalities
(lack of appropriability), lack of knowledge of benefits of
training, risk aversion, and capital market failures.
Government support of schooling, higher
level education and special training. Con-
trol of education quality and content. Se-
lectivity in creation of high-level skills,
geared to industrial strategy.
Information, incentives, subsidies for
in-firm training. Support for foreign train-
ing, importation of foreign trainers.
Information and technical
support:
Knowledge of need for ITD
efforts
Knowledge of kind of efforts
needed to promote ITD
Access to information from







Information services on tech-
nical sources, trends.
Basic research support.
Access to technological in-
formation worldwide.
Information gaps and fragmented information markets (on
sources of technology); “learning to learn” delays; lumpi-
ness of infrastructure facilities; public goods features of
some information (externalities and lack of appropria-
bility); skill gaps; risk aversion; absence of technological
intermediation.
Underdeveloped interfirm linkages, leading to poor diffu-
sion of technology. Inadequate cooperative efforts by firms
to enforce standards and quality.
Absence of links with foreign research.
Information and persuasion on need for
technical activity. Strengthening of intel-
lectual property rights.
Provision of infrastructural services; set-
ting up R&D institutions for selected
industries (and ensuring linkages to enter-
prises). Technical extension services for
small firms. Information services on
sources of technology.
Support for cooperative R&D by indus-
tries. Some mission-oriented R&D sup-
port. Encouragement of subcontracting
and local procurement.
Links with foreign R&D.
Finance for ITD:
Availability of finance on ap-
propriate rates and in suffi-
cient quantity for R&D or
the commercialization of in-
novations.
Equity sharing finance for in-
novators.
Special finance for small and
medium sized enterprises.
Capital market failures due to asymmetric or missing infor-
mation, adverse selection, moral hazard, cost of evaluation
or enforcement of ITD loans; risk aversion or
over-conservative policies by financial intermediaries.
Lack of relevant financial intermediation skills.
Creating technology financing capabilities
in banks, with training subsidies (to start
with only); special financial provision for
ITD efforts that link up with R&D insti-
tutes; financial instruments for SMEs;
venture capital and other schemes to pro-
vide special instruments for risk sharing.




promotion of local R&D,
other interventions to
strengthen ITD.
Insufficient investment in local R&D (due to the above fac-
tors).
Transfer of technology suffers from international technol-
ogy market imperfections, monopolistic or oligopolistic
suppliers, asymmetric information.
Absorption of imported technology limited by local ab-
sorption capacity, plus other failures above that deter ITD.
Fiscal and other incentives for R&D; pro-
curement of products incorporating local
innovations; information service on
sources of technology; selective control of
FDI and negotiation to ensure local “know
why” development. Selective support for
R&D projects with large potential benefits
and externalities.
Source: Lall, 1993, pp. 746-747.
growth path and is associated with static and dy-
namic economies of scale. While there is no reason
why the market will necessarily select the most ap-
propriate alternative, this does not mean that the gov-
ernment has the capacity to do so. It is increasingly
clear, however, that the government must play a role
in coordinating the change. Firstly, it can provide a
forum for debate among the interested parties in the
economy, and it may serve as a means of strengthen-
ing mutual commitments for embarking on a process
of change. Secondly, it can be a link between profes-
sional analysis and the political forces which is
necessary in order to solve the problems of distribu-
tion and equity which invariably accompany struc-
tural change.
The debate on government failures occupies a
leading place in the literature on industrial policy,
since such failures largely determine the results of
the policies adopted. Shapiro and Taylor (1990)
have made a review of the arguments put forward in
this respect in which they note the difficulties that
exist but at the same time highlight the cases where it





When we look at policies for promoting develop-
ment, we see that the problems of macroeconomic
coordination occupy a secondary place, merely serv-
ing as a context for more specific policies. However,
the interaction of the macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic configurations largely conditions the growth
potential of an economy.
In analysing the problems of coordination at the
macro level, the contribution made by Leijonhufvud
(1981) is of fundamental importance for trying to un-
derstand some features of the behaviour of develop-
ing economies in situations of imbalance. His view
may be summed up as follows: the economic system
will behave differently, depending on the type of
shift away from the path of “full coordination”3 that
takes place. If the shift is moderate and the system is
within a range that Leijonhufvud calls a “corridor”,4
the homeostatic mechanisms will come into play and
correct the tendencies. Outside the corridor, these
mechanisms are weaker, and the system is increas-
ingly exposed to “effective demand failures”.5
Within the corridor, the multiplier repercussions are
weak and are dominated by neoclassical market ad-
justments; outside the corridor, they are strong
enough to amplify themselves endogenously as a re-
sult of the effect of shocks on the previous state.
Consequently, the multipliers will increase with the
distance from the ideal path.
Conventional macroeconomics considers that
shifting away from the path leads economies to lo-
cate themselves within the corridor, so that the im-
balance will only be temporary and the policy
problem consists of seeking instruments that will
make it possible to reduce the length of time that the
economies are out of balance. As Fanelli and Frenkel
(1995) note, however, this is not the right approach
to take when analysing macroeconomic problems in
the Latin American economies, because of the mag-
nitude, duration in time and recurrence of their
macro-level imbalances. These economies tend to be
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3
“Full coordination” means that the existing markets are
cleaned up; it refers to the state in which all excesses of demand
and supply are eliminated. It does not mean “efficient alloca-
tion”.
4 The breadth of the corridor is variable and is mainly deter-
mined by the stock of liquid assets maintained by the economic
agents. These stocks act as buffers when shocks hit the econ-
omy. When these shocks are very large and unexpected, the
buffers are exhausted, thus further heightening the problems of
coordination.
5
“Effective demand failure” is the failure of the markets to
transmit messages on desired transactions from one place to an-
other.
located systematically outside Leijonhufvud’s corri-
dors, so that their imbalances are further increased.
There is a feature which sums up the variety of
factors that help determine an economy’s propensity
to give rise to coordination failures: the degree of
stochastic volatility and unpredictability in the evolu-
tion of the basic variables. The greater this volatility,
the more difficult it will be to anticipate its evolution
and the economy’s propensity to generate macroeco-
nomic imbalances. An economy with these features
will give rise to forms of conduct at the microeco-
nomic level which are absent when these elements
are not found and which may even go in the opposite
direction to that which might be expected if the phe-
nomenon were sporadic. It is one thing to pass
through a stage of imbalance, but quite another thing
to have to live in an economy likely to generate such
a state systematically. In this latter situation, the in-
fluence of the macro configuration over the micro
structure will be much more permanent and visible.
There are features in the economic structure which
cannot be explained solely in micro terms, without
reference to the macro context in which they take
place. The mutations observed are related in one way
or another with the fact that, in an economy marked
by high macroeconomic uncertainty, flexibility for
changing past decisions has an economic price. “Ex-
treme preference for flexibility” has fundamental
consequences for real resource allocation, the finan-
cial morphology, and –through its effects on invest-
ment and innovative capacity– for growth.
Just as different macroeconomic configurations
determine different forms of behaviour and structures
at the micro level, so the structural characteristics of
each economy (the micro factors) are important in
determining the degree of macroeconomic instability.
On the one hand, the greater the number and severity
of market failures and the lower the degree of devel-
opment of the institutions related with economic ac-
tivity, the greater will be the level of weakness –or
even complete absence– of market mechanisms
which can act as buffers against imbalance and hence
the greater the tendency of the economies in question
to generate imbalances and follow dynamic adjust-
ment paths which tend to reproduce or amplify those
imbalances instead of correcting them. This is be-
cause the self-regulation capacity of the economy de-
pends on the degree of development of its markets
and institutions, which are responsible for handling
the uncertainty inherent in all economic activities.
On the other hand, the lower the degree of diversifi-
cation and sophistication of production, the less ca-
pacity there will be to reallocate resources quickly to
new activities when lasting shocks take place, and
hence the longer the period during which the econ-
omy will operate in a state of imbalance. Both these
situations are typical of developing Latin American
economies.
VI
The debate in the World Bank
In the 1980s, the position adopted by the World
Bank on the role of government intervention in the
economy, and especially in industrial development,
was clearly expressed in the set of policies based on
what Williamson (1990) called the Washington Con-
sensus. According to this approach, countries should
adopt the measures indicated in the neoclassical
growth model, which claimed that the market forces
alone would permit optimal resource allocation, dis-
carding the fundamental role that the less developed
countries had previously been assigning to selective
intervention by the State as the “motor of develop-
ment”. Thus, for the Washington Consensus indus-
trial policy was definitively ruled out as a way of
improving any economic situation. Policy criteria
were linked together through economic openness,
deregulation and the privatization processes which
formed the foundations for the structural reforms
proposed by the World Bank and were essential req-
uisites for obtaining loans.
In the course of the World Bank’s own opera-
tions, however, little by little different points of view
arose within the institution on the role of the State in
economic development, so that the pure neoclassical
view which had prevailed in the Bank’s prescriptions
was questioned in relation to both its theoretical and
its empirical bases. Thus, within the World Bank it-
self, staff members’ reports began to appear which
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reexamined the Bank’s arguments; at the same time,
changes were made in the conditions that countries
had to fulfill in order to obtain loans and receive pos-
itive appraisals from the institution. One of the first
challenges to the Bank’s position came in documents
prepared by its Industry and Energy Department.
An example of this is a study requested from
that department and carried out by Atiyas, Dutz and
Frischtak (1992), the objective of which was to es-
tablish a conceptual framework for the problems of
industrial reconversion. The analytical framework
prepared in that report is put forward as an instru-
ment for guiding government actions designed to
create an environment that will stimulate efficient in-
dustrial reconversion. It identifies the main obstacles
to the adoption of the right reconversion decisions,
grouping them in three main categories: discipline,
mobility/versatility, and resources. Obstacles to dis-
cipline are those which protect firms from the effect
of competition, prolong their survival, and allow
managers to put off reconversion decisions. Obsta-
cles which restrict mobility reduce the capacity of
firms to reallocate factors in response to a changing
environment. It has been observed, however, that dis-
cipline and mobility are not enough to give rise to
relatively efficient reconversion processes when the
necessary resources (experience, information and fi-
nance) are not available. For each group of obstacles,
the report classifies the government actions needed
to eliminate distortions in the policies applied, pro-
vide rules and mechanisms that make up for market
failures, and create institutions to apply those rules.
In another report, Frischtak (1993) claims that
labour flexibility and the ability to relocate capital
quickly are the most important requisites in the ini-
tial or defensive phases of reconversion. In order to
achieve labour flexibility, it is necessary to eliminate
restrictive labour regulations, to introduce adequate
unemployment compensation, and to support activi-
ties for relocating and retraining labour. In trying to
relocate capital quickly, the most burdensome restric-
tion is usually shortage of credit, so that useful mea-
sures are those providing subsidies for withdrawal
from certain activities, financed with taxes on the in-
dustries that remain in those activities, or subsidies
for change of activity which make it easier for firms
to give up the least profitable lines of production.
When reconversion is successful, it usually increases
the productivity and profitability of firms. Mainte-
nance of the position thus attained requires a good
deal more effort on the part of the entrepreneurs and
the application of various measures designed to se-
cure successful reconversion, however. These in-
clude adopting an aggressive attitude in the
technological field, obtaining finance for investments
and innovation and, above all, a new organizational
culture emphasizing the long-term benefits of such
investments and innovations.
The performance of a number of East Asian
countries over the last quarter of a century has caught
the attention of the whole world. This group of na-
tions kept up high and sustained growth rates for a
long period of time, accompanied by an appreciable
improvement in their populations’ income and in the
distribution of that income. In the 1980s, the success
obtained by these countries was considered to repre-
sent confirmation of the neoclassical recipes advo-
cated by the World Bank, in contrast with the
experience of those nations which had followed the
import substitution path through protection of the do-
mestic market and active government intervention.
However, the differences perceived between the poli-
cies applied by the East Asian countries and those
prescribed by the World Bank led the Japanese dele-
gation to that Bank to suggest the execution of a
study designed to review the role played by the gov-
ernment in the economic −and especially the indus-
trial− development of the region (see OECF, 1991).
The suggested study was duly made (World
Bank, 1993).6 Among its most important conclusions
is that in the East Asian economies, in one way or
another, the government intervened –systematically
and through multiple channels –to promote develop-
ment. It classifies the policies applied in two main
groups: basic macroeconomic balances and selective
interventions. Among the first-named, the most im-
portant include macroeconomic stability, major
investments in human capital, stable and reliable finan-
cial systems, limited price distortions, and openness to
foreign technology. Selective interventions include
moderate financial repression (maintaining low but
positive interest rates), managed credit, selective indus-
trial promotion, and export-oriented trade policies.
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The study centers on a type of economic prob-
lems –failures of coordination– which may lead to
market failures, especially in the early stages of de-
velopment, and it interprets some of the intervention-
ist policies applied by East Asian countries as a
response to these problems of coordination. Such
policies place emphasis on cooperative forms of con-
duct among private firms and transparent standards
for measuring success, based on performance.
Some of the East Asian countries covered by the
study went one step further and created economic
contests combining competition with the benefits of
cooperation, both between firms and between the
government and the private sector. The key feature of
each contest is that the government distributes re-
wards (allocations) according to the performance of
the firms, which is verified by the government and
by the competing firms. Such contests need compe-
tent and impartial judges: that is to say, strong insti-
tutions. A high-quality civil service capable of
verifying performance and immune to political inter-
ference is therefore an essential element in allocation
based on contests like those described. Naturally, a
high-quality civil service also strengthens the gov-
ernment’s ability to design and implement policies
not based on contests.
The rapid growth of the East Asian countries
had two complementary elements. The first, and
most essential, of these was attainment of the basic
macroeconomic balances. Their macroeconomic
management was unusually good and their macro-
economic performance was unusually stable, thus
providing a favourable setting for private invest-
ments. Policies designed to increase the integrity of
the banking system and make it more accessible to
non-traditional savers increased the levels of finan-
cial saving. Educational policy, which was focussed
on primary and secondary education, generated rapid
increases in labour skills. Agricultural policies
forced changes in productivity, while not overbur-
dening the rural economy with taxes. Finally, all the
countries kept price distortions within reasonable
limits and opened up to ideas and technology from
abroad. The second element was cautious policies of
intervention. The prerequisites for success, however,
were so stringent that policies formulated in other
developing countries which have tried to follow simi-
lar paths have often failed. In this respect, the study
in question emphasizes the importance of the institu-
tional base in attaining these levels of performance.
The conclusions reached by this World Bank
study on the reasons for the East Asian miracle gave
rise to a new debate which is still under way and was
recently reviewed in a special section on this subject
in World Development (1994), edited by A. Amsden,
which reproduces a number of reports summarizing
some of the critical analyses made in this respect.
The first of these reports is by A. Amsden him-
self, who notes that, by concentrating on the basic
macroeconomic balances, the World Bank study sug-
gests that economic growth is quite a simple process.
This is at variance with all the new growth models,
which emphasize that, because of imperfect informa-
tion, rising yields, dependence on the particular path
chosen, self-reinforcing mechanisms, and other dy-
namic properties, the growth process does not have a
single explanation. This disagreement is due to the
World Bank’s mistaken belief that it is possible to
consider the basic macroeconomic variables (invest-
ment, education, exports) in isolation from their un-
derlying microeconomic bases or institutions. When
these variables and bases are integrated with each
other and the basic microeconomic variables are
placed within the context in which policies are for-
mulated and implemented, growth becomes a more
complex matter, as the new formal models indicate.
The World Bank’s attempt to ascribe most of East
Asian development to “market fundamentalism” is
misleading. For example, if East Asia has had high
rates of saving and investment, these only arose in
conjunction with a particular structure of enterprises
and of the financial system (all banks in South Korea
and Taiwan were publicly owned).
Lall, for his part, believes that the World Bank
study fits in with the market-friendly view set forth
in the World Development Report (World Bank,
1994). After making a number of criticisms on the
study in the light of his “structuralist” view linked
with technological capabilities (arguments which we
set forth earlier in the present article), he indicates
that the success of the industrial policies of the East
Asian countries must be judged as a function of the
different strategies that they followed. What a gov-
ernment considers to be a market failure depends on
its own objectives: what might have been viewed as
satisfactory progress in Hong Kong might be seen as
unsatisfactory (and hence subject to market failures)
in South Korea. The appraisal of market failures calls
for an examination of the technological learning pro-
cess at the micro level. There were crucial differ-
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ences of technological objectives among the countries
studied. The consequent strategies lead to substantial
differences in terms of industrial structures, the types
of exports in which to specialize, the degrees of local
content, endogenous technological capacities, de-
pendence on different forms of technology transfer,
and government involvement (continuous or not).
The effects of industrial policies cannot be evaluated
without reference to the strategies followed. In order
to judge such policies properly it is necessary to take
account, among other things, of the complexity of in-
dustrial activities within and across industries, the
composition and technological sophistication of ex-
ports of manufactures, the extent of local integration,
and local technological deepening. These were the
facets of East Asian industrialization where the strat-
egies of the various countries differed; they identi-
fied their market failures, and their interventions
were aimed at correcting them. The countries which
made most progress were precisely those which ap-
plied strong policies of selective intervention, such
as Japan and South Korea, and which registered the
greatest distortions in relative prices, as the World
Bank data show.
Recently, there have been fresh symptoms of
change in economic thinking. In September 1996,
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) orga-
nized in Washington the Conference on Develop-
ment Theory and Practice, and it was in this context
that John Williamson presented his study “The
Washington Consensus revisited”. This new study by
Williamson is not an official revision of the original
“Consensus” but rather reflects a change in the inter-
national economic policy scene. Subjects which were
previously taboo are now at the centre of discussion.
Among the new ideas put forward by Williamson
are: an increase in saving, while maintaining fiscal
discipline (which of itself is not sufficient); the reori-
entation of public spending towards well-targeted so-
cial expenditure; tax reforms that incorporate the
externalities of the environment; supervision of the
banking system by the State; a competitive exchange
rate; use of the bargaining power of economic blocs
in trade liberalization; promotion of competition in
markets; well-defined property rights within the
reach of all (reduction of inequalities in land distri-
bution); the creation of State or mixed institutions for
carrying out social and promotional activities, and
the improvement of education by increasing expendi-
ture and redirecting it towards primary and second-
ary education. Finally, a recent article by Joseph
Stiglitz (1996) sums up the reappraisal of the East
Asian experience, with emphasis on the role played
by government interventions.
VII
The systemic approach of ECLAC
A recent ECLAC document (ECLAC, 1995) analyses
the exogenous factors in the international setting,
with special emphasis on the exploration of interre-
lated policies: i) macroeconomic policy, especially
financial flows; ii) trade policy, and iii) microeco-
nomic and mesoeconomic policy. Within the frame-
work of a systemic approach, it seeks to group
together the different proposals in a coherent man-
ner, while noting the difficulty of generalizing in a
regional context marked by an enormous diversity of
different situations.
The mesoeconomic and microeconomic policies
for production development put forward by ECLAC
start from the basic assumption that it is necessary
to have suitable macroeconomic, institutional and
trade policies and to investigate the causes of the
productivity gap between the Latin American
and the developed countries and to seek policy rec-
ommendations for overcoming it. Figure 1 shows
ECLAC’s current proposals, indicating their policy
implications, the obstacles to overcoming the pro-
ductivity gap, and the theoretical and empirical
grounds for pursuing an active production devel-
opment policy.
Likewise, Ramos (1996) notes that, as the econ-
omies of Latin America have been stabilizing, there
has been a resurgence of interest in the region in de-
signing longer-term development strategies which
will make it easier to progress from a slow growth
path to a much faster one, like those achieved by the
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FIGURE 1
Bases for a production development policy: the current ECLAC view a
THE PROBLEM: THE DIFFERENCE IN PRODUCTIVITY
• Difference of the order of 2.5 to 1 between Latin America and the developed
countries as regards total physical productivity.
• The gap widened appreciably after World War II.
• The difference exists at both the global and sectoral levels.
• There are enormous differences in productivity even within the same sector.
SCOPE OF PRODUCTION DEVELOPMENT POLICIES
• In order to promote competitiveness and close the productivity gap with the developed countries the following elements are required: i) appropriate
macroeconomic preconditions: suitable macroeconomic policies and the right degree of openness, and ii) an active production development policy:
“horizontal” or mesoeconomic policies which promote systemic competitiveness (innovation and diffusion of technology, training, development of infra-
structure) and macroeconomic policies which provide direct support for the operations of enterprises (production restructuring policies).
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
• The difference in productivity will allow for the initiation of a process of
rapid growth if the countries manage to take advantage of internationally
available technologies.
• It is not so much a question of establishing new sectors which do not as yet
figure in the input-output table, but rather of improving the overall physical
productivity of the existing sectors.
• The heterogeneity which exists between firms in the same sector suggests
that what is needed is the rapid adoption, adaptation and diffusion of the
available technologies rather than high rates of investment in R & D.
• It is difficult to predict the comparative advantages that could be obtained,
since most sectors have low levels of productivity, but such an advantage
could be obtained by one sector if it is able to close the productivity gap
with the developed countries more rapidly than the rest.
• The fall in productivity in the 1980s shows the importance of keeping the
basic macroeconomic balances within acceptable limits.
OBSTACLES TO OVERCOMING
THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP
• Economic policy shortcomings.
– macroeconomic instability.
– distortion of key prices.
– excessive weight and interference of the public sector.
• Shortcomings at the enterprise level.
– lack of innovative entrepreneurs.
– underinvestment in the identification and diffusion of the most
suitable internationally available “hard” and “soft” technologies
because they have the nature of a “collective good”.
• Failures in key markets, externalities, public goods and industrial
organization problems.
– absence of policies to improve the operation of factor markets
(“horizontal policies”).
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of ECLAC (1995).
a This figure does not include other aspects (macroeconomic, trade, finance, etc.) which form a systematic part of the global proposal set forth in ECLAC (1995).
EMPIRICAL GROUNDS FOR AN ACTIVE POLICY
• In most of the late-developing countries the State has played an active role in completing or perfecting markets, providing substitutes for them when neces-
sary and generating an environment that stimulates investment and innovation.
• The efforts of the public sector should extend as far as its real capacity permits. Experience suggests that its participation will be effective when i) it seeks
to facilitate the operation of the market rather than trying to take its place, and ii) it acts in a selective and transparent manner with an awareness of its own
limitations and tries to obviate private rent-seeking activities.
• Experience indicates that there is a wide range of alternatives with regard to intervention: development led by conglomerates (South Korea) or by SMEs
(Taiwan); growth led by local firms (South Korea, Taiwan and Japan) or by public or transnational enterprises; development based on natural resources
with subsequent linkages (Denmark, Sweden and Finland in the past; Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia at present) or on direct initial manufacturing devel-
opment (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan); initial openness based on export promotion with limited import liberalization (most of the recently industrialized
Southeast Asian countries) or free trade almost from the start (Hong Kong and Singapore).
• Although much of Latin America’s import substitution strategy was devoid of economic rationality, it nevertheless made possible important advances in
industrial development, even in technologically sophisticated sectors (the motor industry in Brazil and Mexico).
• Experience suggests that competitive advantages can be acquired through industrial policy if: i) the incentives provided are only transitory; ii) scales of
production are sufficiently large (because of a large domestic market, promotion of exports from the very beginning, or the production of natural
resource-based intermediate goods which can easily be exported in the event of insufficient domestic demand); iii) the use of either outdated technologies
or those which are still in an experimental stage is avoided.
THEORETICAL GROUNDS FOR AN ACTIVE POLICY
• Incomplete markets.
Asymmetric information, externalities and lack of appropriability, problems of scale, etc. This is reflected in the existence of different
conditions in the markets for technology, human capital, capital (especially long-term capital) and foreign exchange.
• Problems of industrial regulation and organization. These conditions are reflected in special features of each of the economic agents in the
industrialization process (SMEs, economic groups and transnational corporations).
• Increasing returns and strategic complementarities.
The existence of increasing returns to scale at the level of each firm generates pecuniary external economies at the aggregate level and,
ultimately, strategic complementarities which justify action to ensure coordination between private agents and the economic authorities.
successful East Asian late-developing countries. His
analysis highlights two central aspects: first, the pro-
cess of greater openness and restructuring in which
the Latin American countries have been engaged
since the mid-1980s, and second, the enormous dif-
ference in productivity which exists between the en-
terprises of the region and those of the developed
world which use the best international practices.
VIII
Final remarks
Any new industrialization proposal requires a suit-
able appraisal of the positive aspects of the learning
process generated in the past and the problems asso-
ciated with the errors committed. One of the first
great challenges is to generate suitable conditions for
taking advantage of the experience accumulated.
This has given rise to considerable stocks of techno-
logical, economic and skilled human resources, but
at the same time it is essential to overcome its short-
comings and limitations in order to advance towards
the acquisition of dynamic comparative advantages.
The possibility of attaining increasingly high
levels of competitiveness and maintaining them in
the long term cannot be limited to the action of a sin-
gle individual economic agent. International experi-
ence shows that successful cases are due to a whole
set of variables and that it is the overall functioning
of the system which makes it possible to achieve a
solid base for developing competitiveness. Thus, the
systemic notion of competitiveness takes the place of
individual efforts, which, although they are a neces-
sary condition for attaining this objective, must nec-
essarily be accompanied by innumerable other
aspects which form the surrounding environment of
firms (ranging from the physical infrastructure, the
scientific and technological apparatus, the network of
suppliers and subcontractors and the systems of dis-
tribution and marketing, to cultural values, institu-
tions and the legal framework). Competitiveness
which is sustainable in the long term can only be at-
tained through systematic efforts to acquire compara-
tive advantages and to consolidate an “ongoing
endogenous process” covering all the above aspects,
simultaneously defining the responsibilities of the
entrepreneur within his industrial plant and the con-
ditions making up its environment, including both
other private agents and the public sector.
This systemic notion of competitiveness is valid
for each of the markets concerned. Consequently, it
must be applied both to potential export and import
markets. Latin American experience has shown that
it has been possible to expand various types of pro-
duction, but sometimes on clearly weak bases. These
forms of competitiveness have been described as
“spurious” (Fajnzylber, 1990) because they did not
progress in the acquisition of comparative advan-
tages but were based instead on one or more of the
following factors: low wages, processing of natural
resources without preserving the environment, exces-
sively high exchange rates, recessions in the local
market, excessive protection of inefficient local pro-
duction sectors against imports, high export subsi-
dies, etc. These faulty forms of competition gave rise
to fragile individual successes but were incompatible
with benefits of a social nature. Such successes could
not be maintained in the long term and eventually
ran into crises due to the performance of the firms in
question and/or the high social costs involved.
Industrial progress and the attainment of the
strategic objectives pursued will depend on the ca-
pacity and creativeness of governments in designing
and implementing actions best adapted –in terms of
time, intensity and coverage– to the patterns of be-
haviour of the various economic agents. The design,
formulation and implementation of active, explicit
and transparent government policies, together with
their necessary incorporation in a long-term strategic
concept, will call for harmonious and coordinated ac-
tion by public bodies, as well as suitable linkages
with short-term policies. It will also be essential to
redefine the necessary “institutional engineering”.
The weakness and even technical fragility of the
State structures means that efforts must be focussed
on actions whose transparency facilitates the neces-
sary subsequent evaluation of their results. In this
sense, the possibilities of developing and implement-
ing selective policies are limited and conditioned by
the fragility of the public sector.
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A consistent macroeconomic framework is an
indispensable condition for the implementation of in-
dustrial policies, which must themselves include
some clear basic criteria. In particular, such policies
must be explicit, active, and as general and neutral as
possible. They must also give priority to actions
which will have the greatest effect in terms of pro-
pelling the economy as a whole and spreading posi-
tive externalities through it. With regard to this latter
point, the consolidation of infrastructure and the up-
grading of human capital are two of the most impor-
tant aspects (Ffrench-Davis, 1990; Teubal, 1990).
The proposal of an explicit policy must neces-
sarily be associated with a prior and subsequent so-
cial evaluation, the calculation of the corresponding
budgetary implications (especially who is to receive
resources and who is to finance them), the assurance
of total transparency, the clear and precise definition
and quantification of objectives, and a clear time se-
quence with promotional elements which should
preferably go down over time. It is therefore neces-
sary that there should be a system of rewards, but
also one of penalties if the promised objectives are
not attained.
These aspects are of vital importance for achiev-
ing the desired objectives. There are countless exam-
ples of countries which began to support the process
of maturity of infant industries, but without achiev-
ing final success. There is no doubt that the problems
involved in selecting the right sectors and techniques
are by no means insignificant, but appraisal of these
cases has shown that one of the most crucial aspects
is connected with the fact that learning processes do
not take place automatically with time but are instead
the result of deliberate and explicit efforts to generate
stocks of technology and train human resources. It is
therefore necessary to implement a suitable techno-
logical and production strategy associated with in-
vestments aimed at generating or adopting ongoing
technical changes in order to bring about a process of
maturity which is neither automatic nor instanta-
neous but calls for ongoing deliberate efforts.
When there are economic problems as well as
fragile institutions, what is needed is not to “return to
the market” but to “reconstruct the market”: i.e., to
take action to change the institutions governing col-
lective life and to endow them with the capabilities
needed to allow the majority of the population to par-
ticipate effectively in them. Likewise, public indus-
trial development policies should be aimed not only
at promoting changes in the institutional context in
which enterprises operate, but also at carrying out
concrete actions designed to further industrial coop-
eration among firms and thus make possible individ-
ual specialization within a context of complementarity
and further extension of the market.
Industrial policy regimes can provide coordina-
tion mechanisms which are lacking in free market
economies. Where the interdependence and special
nature of assets are important, industrial policy can
be more efficient than the market. Industrial policy
must help to coordinate economic change, to pro-
mote experimentation and to preserve diversity. In
the real world, many changes involve interdependent
decisions. When analysing the logic of industrial pol-
icy, a distinction must be drawn between the role it
plays in two different dimensions: the static and the
dynamic. In both cases the function of industrial pol-
icy is the same: to avoid lack of coordination.
(Original: Spanish)
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